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Community governanceExperimental and observational studies have highlighted the importance of agents being conditionally coopera-
tive when facing a social dilemma. We formalize this mechanism in a theoretical model that portrays a small
community having joint access to a common pool resource. The diffusion of norms of cooperation takes place
via interpersonal relations, while individual agents face the temptation of higher proﬁts by overexploiting the re-
source. Agents remain conditionally cooperative, unless other individuals are misbehaving already. We can ob-
serve a bubble of conditional cooperators slowly building up followed by a sudden burst, which means that a
transition from a cooperative social norm to non-cooperation occurs. Interestingly, in some parameter regions
alternative stable states and limit cycles arise. The latter implies that the same community goes through such
a transition repeatedly over long time spans— history thus repeats itself in the form of the creation and erosion
of social capital.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
By now, it is well established that self-regulation of communi-
ties can be effective in reducing overextraction of natural renewable
resources, such as ﬁsh, forests, or grazing lands (Baland and Platteau,
1996; Ostrom, 1990). Obviously, self-regulation is no panacea and
there are also examples in which community governance fails with
devastating ecological and economic consequences (Ballet et al.,
2007; Ostrom et al., 2007). In those cases, resources are either con-
sistently overexploited, or the community switches suddenly from
a sustainable harvesting regime to an unsustainable one. Typically,
social capital – or its erosion – is highlighted as the pivotal element
of successful community governance (Bowles and Gintis, 2002). In
spite of this, it remains difﬁcult to disentangle different aspects of
social capital in order to understand the underlying mechanisms
and processes (Durlauf, 2002; Sobel, 2002). Empirical studies have.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-NDmade substantial progress in unraveling social capital and have iden-
tiﬁed factors that determine under which conditions community
governance thrives (Ostrom, 2009). In particular, community cohe-
sion (Gutierrez et al., 2011), or individuals being conditionally coop-
erative (Rustagi et al., 2010) has been highlighted in that respect.
Additionally, economic experiments have helped in understanding
the behavior of individuals facing a social dilemma (Fehr and
Gächter, 2000; Janssen et al., 2010; Ostrom et al., 1994). Again, con-
ditional cooperation has been identiﬁed as one of the most pro-
nounced regularities; see Gächter (2007) for an overview. The
importance of conditional cooperation has been highlighted both in
a laboratory setting (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Keser and Van
Winden, 2000), and in the ﬁeld (Frey and Meier, 2004). One of the
main challenges remains to integrate these ﬁndings into formal eco-
nomic theory. By now it is well established that economic models
based on the presumption of purely rational and self-interested
agents generally perform poorly in explaining human decisions in
social dilemma situations (Jager et al., 2000; Ostrom, 1998). Clearly,
the social context is essential to understand individuals' tendency to
conform or violate a social norm (Ostrom, 2010). Strictly speaking,
conditional cooperation is a form of context-dependent behavior,
where the context refers to the number of other people's inclination
to act cooperatively (Grujić et al., 2010; Traxler and Winter, 2012; license.
1 Throughout the paper time arguments are omitted, unless confusion may arise.
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veloping a model to investigate the dynamics of social norms of co-
operation for renewable resource harvesting. We take into account
that individuals may be conditionally cooperative and our analysis
distinguishes i) how social norms of cooperation may spread in the
ﬁrst place, and ii) when conditional cooperators decide to stop obeying
them. Hence, we decompose conditional cooperation into a combina-
tion of social norm compliance, and context-dependent behavior
(i.e. the tendency to violate a social norm if other individuals are also
violating the norm). This distinction has been made verbally, cf. Kahan
(1997) and Keizer et al. (2008), but we are not aware of a formal
model that takes these two processes into account.
The notion of context-dependent behavior is in fact quite old, and
many have suggested that individuals make their choices in a decision
frame or an environmental context (Granovetter, 1985; Simon, 1956).
This is especially the case when time for information acquisition is
scarce, information is costly, and individuals can beneﬁt from group
knowledge by imitating others (Simon, 1959). If the overall uncertain-
ty is high, herd behaviormay be observed, because agents imitate each
other's behavior directly. These informational cascades (Bikhchandani
et al., 1992) are particularly visible not only in extreme situations such
as riots, escape panics, or ﬁnancial crashes, but also in fashions or fads
(Gladwell, 2000; Noelle-Neumann, 1974; Scheffer et al., 2003).
Context-dependent behavior differs from following a social norm,
which is a customary rule of behavior that is self-reinforcing (Young,
2008). When following a norm leads to a strictly higher payoff
than not doing so, there is no need for enforcement. When this is not
the case, social norms are enforced through two mechanisms. The ﬁrst
mechanism can be summarized as social sanctions. Instruments that
have been explored in the literature not only include peer-to-peer pun-
ishments (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Gächter et al., 2008), peer-to-peer
rewards (Vyrastekova and van Soest, 2008), verbal expressions of dis-
agreement and discontent (Masclet et al., 2003), but also the possibility
to exclude individuals from proﬁtable economic exchange (Milinski
et al., 2002), and direct ostracism (Vyrastekova and van Soest, 2007).
In many cases these mechanisms are combined, and the mere threat
of using them is often sufﬁcient to induce cooperative behavior
(Andreoni et al., 2003; Ostrom et al., 1994). The second enforcement
mechanism can be best described by a process of norm internalization
(Young, 2008). A social norm is internalized when an individual feels
obliged to obey it, even when not monitored. In many cases, it is the
combination of sanctions and norm internalization that works hand
in hand: an individual who has internalized a norm may be willing
to bear signiﬁcant costs to punish norm violators (Manski, 2000;
Scott, 1971) This happens because an agent who has internalized a so-
cial norm does not only feel obliged to act in a certain way herself, but
she expects others to follow that strategy as well (Bicchieri, 2006).
Once a certain norm is established in a population, individuals that
did not internalize the norm tend to conform in order to avoid punish-
ment or disapproval that may lead to a loss of social status (Bernheim,
1994). Thus, norm compliance helps in explaining why social norms of
cooperation are followed even if non-cooperation seems the more
proﬁtable choice.
Very little is known about how context-dependency and herd be-
havior interact with well-established social norms. The strongest ev-
idence in this respect comes probably from studies that have looked
at maritime disasters. Frey et al. (2010) compare the sinking of the
Titanic and the Lusitania in terms of survival probability. The authors
conclude that the social norm “women and children ﬁrst” is only
followed on the Titanic, but not on the Lusitania, perhaps because
the Lusitania sunk much quicker, leading to herd behavior overruling
social norms. This ﬁnding has been challenged by Elinder and Erixson
(2012) who analyzed 18 different maritime disasters and concluded
that the enforcement of social norms typically breaks down in such
situations irrespective of the duration of the catastrophe, the Titanic
being an exception.In our model, a common pool resource is harvested by community
members that are either cooperatively minded or selﬁsh (referred to
as defectors). Following the literature on economic cooperation in so-
cial dilemma situations (Bischi et al., 2004; Bulte and Horan, 2010;
Sethi and Somanathan, 1996) we assume that individuals are more
inclined to defect if the proﬁts of doing so are particularly high. Social
pressure arises as a result of defectors being surrounded by coopera-
tive agents (Iwasa et al., 2007; Tavoni et al., 2012). Following Richter
et al. (forthcoming), we assume that cooperators are intrinsically mo-
tivated to obey the social norm and try to persuade defectors to coop-
erate as well.
The new element in this study is that a distinction ismade between
intrinsic cooperators, who have fully internalized the norm and condi-
tional cooperators, who have not. An individual of the latter group is
acting cooperatively but tempted by the higher proﬁt he considers to
join the group of defectors. We assume that the tendency to become
a defector depends on the number of agents that is already defecting
(Granovetter, 1978; Macy, 1991). By incorporating conditional coop-
eration, it is shown that the socioeconomic system may suddenly
collapse, even if it is stable from the outside. This happens, because
unnoticed the group of conditional cooperators – indistinguishable
from intrinsic cooperators – slowly increases in size and a bubble of
conditional cooperators builds up. The decision to defect has a sto-
chastic component, and if defection happens to increase (by chance),
the bubble suddenly bursts. Then, herd behavior can be observed, as
conditional cooperators cascadingly turn into defectors. In contrast
to earlier work by Richter et al. (forthcoming), the collapse is not
caused by alternative stable states but even materializes if the system
has only one equilibrium. In addition, the model also generates sud-
den changes due to alternative stable states or limit cycles.
In Section 2 we develop the social–ecological model, derive opti-
mal harvesting strategies and formulate the dynamical model. The
model is based on three coupled differential equations describing
the evolution of the resource stock, as well as the social norms.
Section 3 analyzes the model and presents results, while Section 4
concludes and sketches further avenues of research.
2. The Social–ecological Model
We start from the model of contagious cooperation studied by
Richter et al. (forthcoming), and extend this model by incorporating
conditional cooperation. We assume that there are N agents in a small
community who have access to a commonly-owned natural resource.
The common property regime is such that outsiders are not allowed
to access the harvest grounds to extract the resource (Schlager and
Ostrom, 1992). Resource regeneration is described by the generic logis-
tic equation, which assumes a spatially fully diffused resource with a
uniform density and a natural growth function that is speciﬁed as




where X denotes the biomass of the natural resource, r is the intrinsic
growth rate and K the carrying capacity.1 Furthermore, we assume
that the community faces a complex social dilemma caused by two ex-
ternalities. First, harvesting gives rise to an intertemporal negative ex-
ternality as excessive extraction today reduces the size of the available
resource stock tomorrow. While the beneﬁts of harvesting are individ-
ual, the subsequent effect on the development of the stock is borne by
all community members. Second, resource exploitation is getting in-
creasingly costly if aggregate effort increases. An example for such a
static externality is congested resource grounds, forcing individuals to
spend more time and fuel to ﬁnd a good spot, and replacing material
that interferes and tears (Boyce, 2000; Schlager, 2002). While it is in
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into account, each individual has the incentive to only care about her
own payoff. Our approach is similar to the one of Bischi et al. (2004),
who assume that cooperators maximize joint proﬁts, while selﬁsh indi-
viduals, referred to as defectors, only maximize their individual proﬁts.
2.1. Resource Harvesting Decisions
Each agent can either decide to engage in resource harvesting or
has the outside option to work on an alternative economic activity.
Time is limited, and each individual is endowed with a ﬁxed effort
rate ê which can be divided between these two activities. The rate at
which agent i allocates effort to resource harvesting at time t is denot-
ed by ei(t), i = 1,…, N. The return to effort in the alternative economic
activity is constant and equal to w per unit of effort, which is conse-
quently the opportunity cost of engaging in resource harvesting. The
income agent i derived from this activity per unit of time at time t is
consequentlyw e^−ei tð Þð Þ;where 0≤ei tð Þ≤e^: The relationship between
an individual agent's harvesting effort ei(t) and the quantity of re-
source goods harvested is given by the Schaefer production function
hi tð Þ ¼ qX tð Þei tð Þ; ð2Þ
where q is the catchability coefﬁcient. The development of the re-







where E =∑i = 1N ei. Regarding harvesting revenues, we assume that
resource goods can be sold at a constant price P so that agent i's
sales revenues are Phi(t). We follow Clark (1980) by modeling the in-
stantaneous negative externality as a cost component in the proﬁt
function that depends on the aggregate effort E(t) the community
puts into resource harvesting.2 We thus assume that if an agent em-
ploys effort ei(t), she incurs congestion costs equal to Z(ei, …eN) =
vE(t)ei(t), where v reﬂects the marginal costs of congestion associated
with one unit increase in aggregate effort.3 Individual proﬁts πi are
then given by
πi X; e1;…; eNð Þ ¼ PqXei þw e^−eið Þ−vEei: ð4Þ
Intrinsic cooperators (CI) and conditional cooperators (CC) try to
manage the resource optimally by employing their fair share of the
aggregate optimal effort rate that gives the maximum economic
yield (MEY), as given by eCMEY = EMEY/N with C = CI, CC. Cooperators
invest eCMEY only when the resource is at the equilibrium level that
supports the MEY. If this is not the case, cooperators use an adaptive
effort rule in order to approach the MEY. This implies that if defectors
overexploit, cooperators will reduce their effort rates as an attempt to
rebuild the resource stock. In order to determine eCMEY, we solve the
maximization problem of cooperators, which depends on the discount




PqXE−vE2 þw Ne^−Eð Þ
 
e−δtdt ð5Þ2 Alternatively, one could assume that crowding does not increase costs, but de-
creases productivity, which would give similar results. Indeed, both speciﬁcations have
similar consequences as they cause harvesting effort and proﬁts to be smaller, and ef-
fort rates chosen by cooperators to be (weakly) lower than those by defectors.
3 The partial derivatives are given by ∂Z/∂ei = vE and ∂Z/∂E = vei, while the cross
partial derivate is given by ∂2Z/∂ei ∂E = v. This implies not only that the marginal costs
of increasing own effort are higher if the resource grounds are particularly crowded,
but also that the users who are particularly active suffer more from an increase in effort
by others — the economic intuition is that in both cases it is very difﬁcult to avoid con-
tact with other individuals.subject to the dynamics of the resource stock (Eq. (3)) and taking into
account each agent's effort endowment. Writing down the current
value Hamiltonian H tð Þ (Kamien and Schwartz, 1981) gives






where λ is the co-state variable. Taking the appropriate ﬁrst derivatives,
the ﬁrst-order conditions for the cooperators' maximization problem
are
PqX−w−2vE−λqX ¼ 0 ð7aÞ
PqE þ λr−2λr X
K
−λqEþ _λ ¼ δλ: ð7bÞ
Using the dynamics of the resource stock Eq. (3) with Eqs. (7a)
and (7b) and setting all time derivatives equal to zero we obtain







δ2A2−2δr K2P2q4−KPq2 3Bþ 4rvð Þ−2rv Bþ 2rvð Þ þ r2F2−δAþ rF 
q
ð9Þ
with A = KPq2 + 2rv, B = qw and F = A + B.
In order to approach these optimal steady state values, a simple
stock-size dependent effort rule is employed of the type e = a + bX
with a b 0 and b > 0, see Hilborn and Walters (1992). The parameter
a is set at a given value reﬂecting a precautionary reference point that
determines a minimum biomass level, belowwhich effort is chosen to
be zero. The parameter b is set such that each cooperator invests the
socially optimal effort level when the resource stock is at its socially
optimal level, i.e. the one delivering the MEY. Taking further into ac-
count that effort cannot be negative, the effort rate for cooperators is
given by
eC ¼ max aþ bX;0ð Þ with b ¼ eMEY−a
 
=XMEY: ð10Þ
Defectors (D) do neither make an attempt to engage in sustainable
harvesting, nor do they consider the consequences of their actions on
the payoff of fellow community members. Instead, they take advantage
of cooperative efforts by other agents and appropriate all remaining
rents. Therefore, theymaximize the proﬁt function (4) for individual ef-
fort taking into account the number of cooperators,which gives the best
response function (BR):
eBR ¼ PXq−w−vE−ið Þ= 2vð Þ ð11Þ
with E−i = E − ei. For a single defector, the effort of all other agents
can be given by E−i = (D − 1)eD + (N − D)eC, which gives, together
with Eq. (11), the optimal effort of a defector as
eD ¼
PXq−wð Þ−veC N−Dð Þ
v Dþ 1ð Þ : ð12Þ
Furthermore, it is assumed that at any time all agents rapidly
choose the optimal effort that corresponds with their group. We sup-
pose that in the subsequent sections the system resides beyond this
transient state.
2.2. Social Dynamics
In the previous sub-section we have developed a model where


















Fig. 1. The socio-economic dynamics of the system. Directed changes are driven by
moral persuasion, temptation and the inclination to defect once a social threshold is
passed and herd behavior may occur. Conditional cooperators may also change behav-







205A. Richter, J. Grasman / Ecological Economics 93 (2013) 202–209the resource: to act cooperatively, or to defect. The underlying social
dynamics are more complex, as we assume that the community
consists of the three types: Intrinsic cooperators (CI), conditional op-
erators (CC), and defectors (D) with CI + CC + D = N. The main
mechanisms of our social dynamics are developed below and can be
summarized as i) moral persuasion, ii) temptation, and iii) each
agent having a social threshold for defection, giving rise to herd behavior.
Verbally, the essence of our models relies on the following assumptions
that are all empirically well-founded. First, some agents are willing to
uphold a social extraction norm (doing what is optimal for the group
as a whole), and try to impose social pressure on non-cooperators to
also start adhering to the norm (Bicchieri, 2006; Manski, 2000; Scott,
1971). Second, the propensity to (dis)obey a cooperative norm depends
not only on the temptation to defect, but also on whether individuals
have recently been exposed to cooperatively minded agents (Janssen
and Mendys-Kamphorst, 2004; Keizer et al., 2008). Third, agents make
their propensity to defect conditional on the number of agents behaving
accordingly (Granovetter, 1978; Noelle-Neumann, 1974). In Fig. 1 the
dynamics of the social–ecological system are presented in a scheme
showing the mechanism of each component of the system. All agents
have access to the common pool resource, and defectors harvest more
than cooperators (indicated by the thicker arrow). Moral persuasion
turns defectors into intrinsic cooperators, while the temptation to pur-
sue higher harvests triggers agents to lose their intrinsicmotivation and
to become conditionally cooperative. But only if sufﬁciently many
agents defect already, conditional cooperators are prepared to do so as
well, potentially resulting in herd behavior.
Building upon Richter et al. (forthcoming), we assume that intrinsic
cooperators are intrinsically motivated to keep up the social norm and
make an effort in persuading defectors to act cooperatively. Whenever
an intrinsic cooperator meets a defector, there is a probability υ that
the former succeeds in convincing the latter to act cooperatively. As-
suming that social encounters occur randomly, the probability of an in-
trinsic cooperator meeting a defector can be modeled as a Poisson
process. The probability of an encounter taking place in a short time in-
terval (t, t + Δt) is equal to λCI(t)D(t)Δt/N, where λ is the Poisson pa-
rameter. Moral persuasion thus increases the number of intrinsic
cooperators by CI(t + Δt) − CI(t) = αCI(t)D(t)Δt/N, where α ≡ λυ.4
Obviously, intrinsic cooperators take notice of the higher proﬁts
associated with defection. While intrinsically motivated to act coop-
eratively, the prospect of having higher payoffs tempts agents to
start acting selﬁshly, and we assume that agents are more likely to
consider defection the larger πD is compared to πC, see Eqs. (4), (10)
and (12). In our model, intrinsic cooperators do not start defecting
immediately even if temptation is sufﬁciently high. Instead, they
lose the intrinsic motivation to adhere to the social norm and become
conditionally cooperative. More speciﬁcally, we assume that the
transfer rate due to temptation from intrinsic cooperator to condi-
tional cooperator takes the form β CI(1 − πC/πD).
Conditional cooperators do not make an effort in persuading de-
fectors, and make their own cooperation contingent on sufﬁciently
many agents not defecting. The temporal dynamics of the conditional
cooperators depends on the number of cooperators that start hesitat-
ing and on the ones of them that subsequently become defectors. Fol-
lowing the threshold model of cooperative behavior (Granovetter,
1978; Young, 2009), we assume that conditional cooperators are
more inclined to defect if this is a common behavior in the group. A
functional form that satisﬁes these properties can be given by the
sigmoid Hill function, which is a continuously increasing function
with values close to zero for D bb θ and close to unity for D >> θ4 Note that in our model defectors do not change their behavior after an encounter
with conditional cooperators, who are – unlike intrinsic cooperators – not making an
effort to morally persuade defectors.with a rapid transition near D = θ; see also Janssen and Scheffer
(2004) and Scheffer (2009). The social threshold function S(D;θ,γ)
is given by the form
S D; θ;γð Þ ¼ D
γ
θγ þ Dγ ð13Þ
where θ is the point at which S(D;θ,γ) equals 1/2 with slope γ; see
Fig. 2. Since hesitation is a rather uncertain and temporary state of in-
decision, we will assume that there is also a stochastic component in
the decision making process. A small fraction η of the conditional co-
operators will move stochastically to one of the other groups, no mat-
ter what happens around them. The rate at which the group of









θγ þ Dγ þ η
 
ð14Þ
where the parameter μ scales the strength of the herd behavior. Hav-
ing introduced all components of our system, the following equations






























−qX N−Dð ÞeC−qXDeD: ð15cÞ
Note that Eq. (14) can be omitted because CC = N − D − CI. The
dynamics of the system (Eqs. (15a), (15b) and (15c)) depend on0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.2
Number of Defectors D
θ
Fig. 2. The shape for the Hill with parameter values for θ and γ as given in Table 1.
Table 1




CI Number of intrinsic cooperators
CC Number of conditional cooperators
D Number of defectors
Model parameters
N Number of agents 100
r Intrinsic resource growth rate 0.4
K Carrying capacity 100
ê Effort endowment 0.6
q Catchability coefﬁcient 0.01
p Resource sales price 500
v Congestion cost 1
w Opportunity cost of effort 2
δ Discount rate 0.05
a Precautionary reference point −0.3
α Strength of moral persuasion 0.5
β Strength of temptation 0.2
θ Hill function parameter N/4
γ Hill function parameter 5
μ Strength of herd behavior 1
η Stochastic decision parameter 0.1
206 A. Richter, J. Grasman / Ecological Economics 93 (2013) 202–209the chosen values of the parameters. In Table 1 the set of parameters is
presented with their economic denotation. Moreover, default values
are given, which are used throughout this study unless it is speciﬁed
differently in the text.
3. Results
The presence of conditional cooperators in combination with the
ﬁnite effort endowment leads to very interesting dynamics of the sys-
tem such as hysteresis and sudden changes in the time domain.
Throughout the analysis, we will distinguish two cases: the effort en-
dowment e^ is either relatively high or low. If e^ is high, the pressure on
the resource is consequently also high. If e^ is low, the pressure on the
resource is relatively low, for example because the household size is
small or the available technology is limiting the maximum exploita-
tion rate.
3.1. Equilibria and Limit Cycles
Firstwe analyze the casewhere the pressure on the resource is high;
see Fig. 3. For any starting value (CI,0,D0,X0) the system will tend to ei-
ther an equilibrium (CI⁎,D*,X*) or a limit cycle.5 Two trivial equilibria
are easily traced from Eqs. (15a), (15b), and (15c). First, if no intrinsic
cooperators are present in the community, moral persuasion is absent
and ultimately all community members will be defecting, as given by
CI⁎ = 0 and D* = N. This equilibrium is globally stable for small values
of the moral persuasion parameter α; see Fig. 3a. Second, if temptation
is absent (β = 0), all individuals will become intrinsic cooperators, as
given by CI⁎ = N and D* = 0 For increasing values of β we ﬁnd a con-
tinuation in the formof an internal equilibrium, see Fig. 3b. This equilib-
rium state is stable except for a small interval of βwhere it is unstable:
through a Hopf bifurcation a small amplitude stable limit cycle arises at
one end of the interval and disappears at the other end. Stable periodic
solutions with larger amplitudes are found for various parameter
values. Fig. 3c shows an example of a limit cycle unfolding over time.
The results are qualitatively similar for the case where pressure on
the resource is relatively weak (e^ is low), except for some important5 Unless speciﬁcally stated, all results are insensitive to starting values.differences; see Fig. 4. First, if the effort endowment e^ is low, exploi-
tation is less severe, which implies a larger equilibrium resource
stock. Second, full defection occurs even if moral persuasion is rela-
tively high; compare Figs. 3a with 4a. Full defection also occurs if
temptation is relatively weak, ceteris paribus; compare Figs. 3b with
4b. It is perhaps surprising that higher defection occurs if e^ is smaller
and the pressure on the resource is weaker. This ﬁnding is explained
by the fact that a smaller e^ implies that X is larger for a given number
of defectors, which means that proﬁts for defectors are also larger.
Therefore, the higher the e^, the fewer defectors are needed to have
all rents dissipated. Third, and largely unexpected, we ﬁnd that alter-
native stable states may coexist if e^ is low. For example if temptation
increases (a shift along the horizontal axis in Fig. 4b), defection grad-
ually increases, but suddenly the system ﬂips to a stable equilibrium
of full defection. Fig. 4c shows such an example of hysteresis with
two simulations for the same set of parameters and different initial
conditions. While the upper panel portrays a situation where full
defection occurs rapidly, in the lower panel initial conditions are
such that the system stabilizes with only half the agents defecting.
This shows that the steady state may be situated at either of the
two branches depending on the history of the system.
3.2. Bubbles and Hidden Transitions
We next consider the community facing a situation without a
temptation to defect (β = 0). Then, at t = 0, a change takes place,
which brings about a strong temptation (β = 0.3); see Fig. 5a. In the
beginning, no alarming changes can be observed, as the number of co-
operatively working agents CI + CC decreases only very slowly and
the resource X remains at a high level. Suddenly, a drastic collapse of
cooperation occurs and defection overshoots to a level involving 95%
of all community members, before defection equilibrates at about
60% of all agents. From the outside, the underlying process cannot be
explained without understanding the role of conditional cooperators;
see Fig. 5b. Unnoticed from the outside, a steady transition of intrinsic
cooperators CI into conditional cooperators CC has occurred, resulting
in a bubble of conditional cooperators and ultimately in a collapse of
the social–ecological system. An important element in this process is
the threshold mechanism that is incorporated in the model through
the Hill function and the stochastic component (η > 0) in the decision
making process. This implies that if the number of defectors is small,
a conditional cooperator chooses with equal chance either to return
to the group of intrinsic cooperators CI or to become a defector
D; see also Eqs. (15a), (15b) and (15c). When the number of defectors
increases, a spiral of defection materializes and agents defect
cascadingly, which is typical for herd behavior. Note that this process
materializes in spite of no apparent complexities, such as alternative
stable states. This phenomenon is simply caused by the adjustment
transition towards one stable equilibrium. So even if the system is out-
side the domain of limit cycles or alternative stable states, surprises
may occur as a result of the internal dynamics.
3.3. Dependence upon Exogenous Factors
While social complexity in the form of conditional cooperation is
the main mechanism behind the results, external driving forces may
affect the resilience of the system and may induce a shift between dif-
ferent qualitative states (limit cycle, single equilibrium, alternative
stable states). Fig. 6 shows how ecological, economic or demographic
changes can alter the state of the social–ecological system. A change in
the intrinsic growth rate, for example due to climate change, has a
profound effect on the number of defectors (Fig. 6a). For very small
and intermediate intrinsic growth rates, a limit cycle can be observed,
while in-between a stable equilibrium materializes. Surprisingly, de-
fection rises with a higher intrinsic growth rate, and then gradually
falls again. This dome shaped defection pattern translates into a


































TimeTemptation βMoral persuasion α
Fig. 3. The equilibrium number of defectors D (solid) and the level of the resource X (dashed) for different parameter values of the moral persuasion parameter α (a) and temptation
β (b) for the case where pressure on the resource is high and e^ = 0.6. Over time, oscillatory dynamics may occur, β = 0.15 (c).
207A. Richter, J. Grasman / Ecological Economics 93 (2013) 202–209sigmoid shape of the resource stock (see dashed line in Fig. 6d). While
a higher intrinsic growth rate does not immediately result into a
higher resource stock (as defection increases as well), there is a
point where enough rents are created to make cooperation viable,
which results in decreasing defection and increasing resource stock,
which ultimately approaches the resource stock delivering the maxi-
mum economic yield (XMEY).
Economic change, for example an increase in the return of the out-
side opportunity w has a negative effect on defection because it
makes working elsewhere more proﬁtable and overexploitation less
tempting (Fig. 6b). Consequently, an increase in w brings the system
closer to the XMEY, even though not substantially (Fig. 6e). Again, a
transition from a stable equilibrium to a limit cycle can be observed.
Demographic change, such as an increase in the number of com-
munity member due to population growth, has a strong effect on de-
fection. For very low levels of N, all community members cooperate
(Fig. 6c), and the resource stock X is well above the XMEY (Fig. 6f).
When the community size increases above a certain level, the social
dilemma materializes, defection occurs, and the resource stock drops
below the XMEY. Once the resource stock drops below the XMEY, coop-
erators start restraining themselves, defection is still rare, and the re-
source stock decreases only marginally. Once the system reaches a
limit cycle, defection increases substantially and also the resource
gets depleted severely. For high levels ofN, defection keeps increasing,
but at a rate less than the population increases (which would be given
by the 45 degree line). As a result, the resource stock equilibrates at a
low level of X.
4. Conclusions
We have shown that the presence of conditional cooperators
has profound effects on the evolution and the robustness of commu-
nity governance systems. Combining the effects of moral persua-
























Fig. 4. The equilibrium number of defectors D (solid) and the level of the resource X (dashe
alternative stable may occur, depending on different initial values, α = 0.16. Initial value
lower one.patterns, as well as surprising dynamics. The model corroborates ear-
lier ﬁndings that not only the resource dynamics, but also the evolu-
tion of cooperation depends markedly on the time available for
working that is constraining effort (Richter et al., forthcoming). Per-
haps surprisingly, defection can be much more pronounced if less
time is available for working in the resource sector and the aggregate
pressure on the resource is only modest. This shows that social norms
of cooperation may be more difﬁcult to establish if defectors are still
able to enjoy high proﬁts because the resource is still in a decent
shape. This sheds interesting light on the question whether a crisis fa-
cilitates or impedes institutional change (North, 2005). In that respect,
the interaction of conditional cooperation and deteriorating external
conditions may explain why social norms – once established – may
suddenly collapse. An important insight from our model is that incor-
porating conditional cooperators may lead to surprising dynamics,
even if the system is apparently stable and features a single equilibri-
um. This happens because the shift from agents being intrinsically
cooperative towards being conditionally cooperative occurs largely
unnoticed. Thus, we may observe a collapse of the sustainable exploi-
tation of a resource due to a massive defection of agents previously
cooperating because of herd behavior.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the qualitative dynamics of the resource
system may suddenly change. Depending on exogenous shocks, the
social–ecological system may either have a single stable equilibrium,
alternative stable states, or even a limit cycle. In particular, a change
in the intrinsic growth rate (r) leads to surprising patterns, as it has
a limit cycle at low and intermediate values for r and a stable equilib-
rium in-between. Equally important is the dome-shaped relationship
between defection and the intrinsic growth rate. This result may
have strong implications for the governance of complex ecosystems,
because a reduced stock productivity has not only a direct effect
on the steady state resource biomass, but also an indirect effect, trans-
mitted through higher defection. This seems especially relevant for
















d) for different parameter values of α (a) and β (b) for e^ = 0.275. Panel c shows that
s are (CI,0,D0,X0) = (5,90,20) in the upper panel and (CI,0,D0,X0) = (25,70,20) in the






































Fig. 5. Sudden change from a state in which cooperation is the norm to a state in which defection is widespread. The number of cooperatively working agents CI + CC (green solid)
slowly decreases up to the moment of collapse (a). The resource X (blue dotted) also remains at a high level. The number of defectors D (red solid) stays low until the collapse. The
sudden collapse of cooperation (light green) can only be understood when one observes the sudden transition of intrinsic cooperators CI (dark green) into conditional cooperators
CC (yellow) (b).
208 A. Richter, J. Grasman / Ecological Economics 93 (2013) 202–209growth rate (Hutchings, 2005), for example due to climatic changes
(Walther et al., 2002), loss of habitat (Armstrong and Falk-Petersen,
2008), trophic interactions (Terborgh and Estes, 2010), or evolution-
ary change (Enberg et al., 2012).
In ourmodel, we assume that defectors can be easily identiﬁed upon
social encounter, which may be more realistic for small communities,
where defectors are unable to form their own social clusters or
“gangs” to avoid social pressure (Acheson, 1988). Also, we rule out the
possibility to hide harvests— an assumption that seems more plausible
if the resource grounds are either small, or resources have to be landed
at a central place. If monitoring is more difﬁcult, this may impede the
evolution of cooperative harvesting norms (Coleman and Steed, 2009;
Rustagi et al., 2010). If defectors can hide some of their harvests, this
may also imply that cooperators fail to perceive the correct resource
stock levels and do not take the required efforts to rebuild the stock.
This seems especially relevant for resource systemswhere the resource
stock is not directly visible, as is the case for most ﬁsheries (Gutierrez
et al., 2011). In our model, a systemic collapse is entirely due to the
institutional setting and the underlying biological processes are rather
simple. We assume that the renewable resource grows logistically,
which has the advantage that any emerging social phenomena arise




















































Fig. 6. Depicted are the equilibrium number of defectors D (a–c) and the level of the resourc
demographic change (N) for e^ = 0.6.favors usually cooperation, because cooperative clusters can emerge
that defectors cannot invade (Noailly et al., 2007), while cooperation
in non-spatial models requires additional mechanisms. For a similar
reason we omitted more speciﬁc resource characteristics, such as an
Allee effect that may occur in biological populations. It is well known
that many resource systems are inherently non-linear and may fully
collapse if the resource abundance is too low (Kramer et al., 2009). In
this study we have chosen to model the dynamics of the resource by
using the relatively simple logistic growth model. In this way it has
become clear that collapse does not occur as the result of a complicated
entanglement of resource dynamics and behavior of the agents ex-
ploiting the resource, but solely because of social complexity. Therefore,
it remains to be investigated towhat extent adding ecological complex-
ity will affect the evolution of social norms of cooperation.Acknowledgments
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